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Legal subjectivity, particularly that of the majnūn (insane), is an understudied topic that is often only glossed 
over or nominally referenced in academic scholarship on Islamic jurisprudence. In attempting to fill this gap 
in scholarship, this article aims at examining the epistemological and ethical dimensions of legal subjectivity, 
particularly as it relates to the insane. The article takes the concept of taklīf in classical Ash'arite works of 
jurisprudence as the center of its analysis of legal subjectivity. Taklīf, its characteristics, the relationship 
between the law giver and the legal subject, and the host of epistemological and ethical assumptions embedded 
in assigning legal subjectivity to certain individuals and excluding others from it, were among the main 
issues that classical Muslim jurists grappled with. Understanding the concept of taklīf as a form of 
prescriptive speech, Ash‘arite jurist-theologians went on to articulate a theory of legal subjectivity that 
emphasized the mental capability of the legal subject to comprehend the moral import of divine prescriptive 
address and to respond to it with cognizant and intentional obedience. In stressing the value of cognitive 
ability, Ash‘arī jurists contended that the majnūn’s comprehending capacity fell short of the level necessary to 
acquire legal subjectivity. Beyond the issue of the legal subjectivity of the insane, studying the concept of taklīf 
allows us to understand severe ways in which Ash‘arī jurists conceived of reason/rationality, the relationship 
between intentionality, knowledge and action, and the nature of divine speech and its normative value. 
 
Abstrak 
Subjektivitas hukum, terutama terkait majnūn (orang gila), adalah topik yang jarang dikaji atau hanya 
mendapatkan perhatian sepintas di kesarjanaan hukum Islam. Untuk mengisi ruang kosong tersebut, artikel 
ini berupaya mengkaji dimensi epistemologis dan etis subjektifitas hukum, terutama terkait isu orang gila. 
Artikel ini mengambil konsep taklīf dalam karya-karya hukum klasik mazhab Asyʿari sebagai titik pusat 
kajian atas isu subjektifitas hukum. Taklīf, karakteristiknya, dan hubungan antara pembuat undang-undang 
dan subjek hukum, serta seperangkat asumsi-asumsi epistemologis dan etis yang dijadikan alasan untuk 
menetapkan seseorang dan melepaskan orang yang lain dari taklīf adalah isu utama yang diperdebatkan oleh 
para pakar hukum Muslim klasik. Berangkat dari pandangan bahwa konsep taklīf adalah satu bentuk 
prescriptive speech (bahasa yang mengikat/menentukan), pakar hukum dan teolog mazhab Asyʿari 
membangun teori subjektifitas hukum yang menitikberatkan pada kemampuan mental subjek hukum untuk 
memahami nilai moral dari ketentuan ilahiah yang diberikan dan meresponnya dengan kepatuhan yang sadar 
dan disengaja. Untuk menjelaskan arti penting dari kemampuan kognitif, pakar hukum mazhab Asyʿari 
berargumen bahwa kemampuan orang gila dalam memahami sesuatu tidak mencapai level yang dibutuhkan 
untuk memperoleh subjektifitas hukum. Di atas isu subjektifitas hukum orang gila, studi mengenai konsep 
taklif ini menjelaskan sejumlah cara yang digunakan oleh mazhab Asyʿari memahami akal/rasionalitas, 
hubungan antara kesengajaan, ilmu, dan tidakan, dan karakter dari kalam ilahiah serta nilai normatifnya.  
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Introduction  
 What is it about classical Muslim jurist’s 
conception of legal subjectivity that left the 
majnūn (insane) outside the law’s domain of 
address? It is often explained that the majnūn, 
being deprived of the faculty of reason and 
discernment, is not legally responsible for his 
actions both in this world—in front of judges 
and courts—and in the hereafter as his actions 
carry no negative consequential moral value in 
the eyes of the lawgiver. However, embedded in 
this emphasis on reason and discernment as 
grounds of legal subjectivity, is a range of 
epistemic and ethical assumptions that are often 
not readily or comprehensively articulated 
when addressing the legal subjectivity of the 
majnūn.  
 These assumptions, nonetheless, can be 
found scattered throughout various theoretical 
discussions within classical works of 
jurisprudence. The purpose of this paper is to 
examine these discussions as they are found in 
the works of Ash‘arī jurist-theologians and to 
use this analysis to make intelligible the 
epistemological and ethical assumptions that 
played into the way Ash‘arī jurists understood 
the legal subjectivity of the majnūn. In doing so, 
I hope to shed light on the way these jurist-
theologians understood reason/rationality, the 
relationship between intentionality, knowledge 
and action, and the nature of divine prescriptive 
speech and the functions it serves. 
 The texts used in my inquiry are restricted 
to the works of five Ash‘arī jurist-theologians1 
who are all—with the exception of the Malikī al-
Ba ̄qillanī (d.1013)— Shāfiʿī jurists from the early 
to the late classical period (10th-15th centuries). 
There are two main reasons for restricting my 
analysis to Ash‘arī jurists. The first has to do 
with the type of jurists that I am choosing to 
focus on and on the role of theology in orienting 
many of their epistemological and ethical 
                                                 
 1 Al-Bāqillanī (d.1013), al-Juwaynī (d.1085), al-Ghazālī 
(d.1111), al-Āmidī (d.1233), and al-Zarkashī (d.1392). 
assumptions that grounds their conception of 
taklīf.  
 The set of texts of jurisprudence which I 
examine in this essay belong to a stream of 
Muslim jurists who are commonly classified as 
al-fuqahāʾ al-mutakallimūn (jurist-theologians). 
These jurists are unique in the way they rely on 
kalām postulates and the epistemological and 
ethical assumptions associated with them in 
developing a range of legal principles. The 
works of these jurists are particularly pertinent 
because they highlight the importance of taklīf  
as an idea that is conceptually situated at the 
intersection between theology and 
jurisprudence. The other reason behind 
choosing to examine Ash‘arī jurist-theologians 
has to do with the fact that the only 
comprehensive work2 that has been so far done 
on the legal subjectivity of the majnūn was 
accomplished through an analysis of Ḥanafī 
texts of jurisprudence. Therefore, focusing on 
Ash‘arī jurists allows us to both extend that 
analysis to them and pose different questions 
about legal subjectivity that are particular to 
Ash‘arī jurisprudence. 
 
Mental Disability in Islamic law and the 
Majnūn as an Object of Definition 
 Within the larger corpus of Islamic legal 
texts, one often finds that mental disability is 
often categorized into four general levels of 
severity. The most sever is what is termed as 
junūn (insanity). In addition to insanity, Islamic 
legal text identified “at least three lesser mental 
conditions of varying severities, namely mental 
impairment (ʿatah), sudden disorientation 
(dahsh), and financial improvidence 
(safah).”3 While each of these categories of 
mental disability and the legal discussions 
                                                 
 2 See: Mian, Ali Altaf. "Mental Disability in Medieval 
Hanafī Legalism." Islamic Studies 51, no. 3 (2012): 247-62. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43049909. 
 3 Ali, Bilal and Hooman Keshavarzi. "Forensic 
Psychiatry." In The Encyclopedia of Islamic Bioethics. Oxford 
Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies. 
com.proxy.uchicago.edu/article/opr/t9002/e0250.  
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associated with them warrants serious study, 
this paper is going to focus primarily on the 
category of insanity as personified by the 
majnūn (the insane). This, however, does not 
negate that there is legal, ethical, and 
epistemological overlap between the 
discussions about the legal subjectivity of the 
majnūn and that of the other categories of 
mental disability. 
 When examining the topic of insanity in 
classical works of Ash‘arī jurisprudence, one of 
first challenges that is commonly faced is the 
absence of any explicit or elaborate definition of 
insanity. References to insanity often juxtapose 
the majnūn (insane) with the ‘āql (rational 
individual). However, beyond this juxtaposition 
it is hard to find any elaborate description of 
who the insane is and what the condition of 
insanity functionally means. In his study of 
Madness in medieval Muslim societies, Dols 
complains that “the jurists dealt with insanity in 
a brief, indirect, and often cursory manner; the 
legal notion of insanity is itself quite imprecise 
and ambiguous.”4 While this might generally be 
true in that, the definitions of insanity that the 
jurists formulated are often non-empirical and 
ambiguous, recent scholars have considered the 
ambiguity to be intentional on the part of jurists. 
By leaving the definition of insanity vague, 
Muslim jurists are thought to have allowed for 
“flexibility in judgment and to encompass a 
wide plethora of abnormal behaviors, including 
sleep disorders, mental retardation, dissociative 
rage, and perhaps even personality disorders.”5 
In terms of the problem of brevity of treatment, 
recent studies point that the jurists dealt with 
the issue of mental disability and the legal 
subjectivity of the insane in a more elaborate 
manner than previously thought. 
 In his excellent study of mental disability in 
Hanafi jurisprudence, Mian points out that, 
                                                 
 4 Dols, Michael W. (Michael Walters), and Diana E. 
Immisch. Majnūn: The Madman in Medieval Islamic Society. 
Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University 
Press, 1992.  451 
 5 Ali, Bilal and Hooman Keshavarzi. "Forensic 
Psychiatry." 
relying on medical and popular understanding 
of mental illness, Hanafi jurists provided several 
definitions of junūn such as “the non-existence 
of intellect and discernment, or the opposite of 
intellect and reason, or the detraction of 
intellect, in which the consistent stream of 
rational action and speech is disrupted.”6 In 
addition, Hanafi jurists distinguished between 
two types of mental disability the first being 
‘atah (mental impairment) and junūn (insanity). 
They further provided subcategories for both 
junūn and ‘atah such as their distinction between 
junūn ‘aradi (temporal madness) and junūn 
mustaw‘ib (perpetual madness).7 Nonetheless, 
the case still remains that Ash‘arī works of 
jurisprudence are lacking in explicit 
descriptions of junūn and its various types. 
Given the fact that these descriptions, as Mian 
mentions, rely on medical and popular 
understanding of mental disability, then one can 
safely assume that Ash‘arī jurists were aware of 
these descriptions and, as will become clear 
within this essay, they implicitly adopted them 
into their understanding of the legal subjectivity 
of the majnūn. 
 
On Taklīf and Khiṭāb 
 When thinking about legal subjectivity in 
Islamic jurisprudence, the most important  
concept that one must examine is the concept of 
taklīf. Taklīf is generally understood to denote 
“an imposition on the part of God of obligations 
on his creatures, of subjecting them to a law.”8 
Drawing their definition of takilf from the 
lexicon, Ash‘arī jurists articulated taklīf as an act 
of imposition that causes a certain hardship or 
difficulty on the part of the mukallaf (legal 
subject). For example, al-Bāqillanī defines taklīf 
                                                 
 6 Ali Altaf Mian. "Mental Disability in Medieval 
Hanafī Legalism.”  253 
 7 Ali Altaf Mian,  254  
 8. Gimaret, D. ‘Taklīf’. In Encyclopedia of Islam, Second 
Edition, edited by  Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, 
E. van Donzel, W. Heinrichs, J. Bearman (Volumes X, XI, 
XII), Th. Bianquis (Volumes X, XI, XII), et al. Accessed 
December 10, 2019. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-
3912_islam_SIM_7344. 
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as “imposing on [the servant] what the servant 
finds a burden and hardship in.”9  
 Similarly, al-Juwaynī (d.1085) understands 
taklīf to be of the nature of an imposition that 
puts a burden on the legal subject but he adds 
the qualification that takilf carries with it the 
meaning of taṭwiq (boundedness), therefore, it 
excludes legal injunctions that fall under the 
meaning of recommendation (nadb) or 
discouragement (karahiyyah).10 The notion of 
imposition that comes up in the way the jurists 
define taklīf  is quite significant because it points 
to the moral/ethical status of Islamic law. The 
injunctions that are imposed through taklīf, 
whether they be commands or prohibitions, 
aren’t understood by Ash‘arī jurists to be 
reflective of any natural moral order or a natural 
human disposition. Al-Ghazali articulates this 
fact when he mentions, as part of his definition 
of taklīf, that the injunctions imposed by the 
process of talkif aren’t based on what the 
individual is naturally inclined to or repulsed 
by.11 Rather, they are a form of burden that one 
takes on in order to earn the pleasure of the law 
giver.  
 There is also another dimension to the idea 
of taklīf that is related to this previous 
discussion about imposition which is concerned 
with the question of the origin of subjectivity to 
the law. From the perspective of Ash‘arī jurists-
theologians, the relationship between the 
internal dispositions of the legal subject and the 
law as the divine address that induces legal 
subjectivity isn’t necessarily one of 
compatibility. Classical Ash‘arī jurist-
theologians contended that ethical value 
judgments are “subjective and refer, not to any 
                                                 
 9 Bāqillāni ̄, Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭayyib, and ʻAbd al-
Ḥami ̄d ʻAlī Abū Zunayd. Taqri ̄b Wa-al-Irshād "al-Ṣaghīr". 
al-Ṭabʻah 1. [Beirut?]: Muʼassasat al-Risālah, 1993.  1/239 
 10 Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, ʻAbd al-Malik ibn 
ʻAbd Alla ̄h, and ʻAbd al-ʻAẓi ̄m Di ̄b. Al-Burhān Fi ̄ Uṣu ̄l Al-
fiqh: Makhṭu ̄ṭ Yunshar Li-awwal Marrah. al-Ṭabʻah 2. al-
Qāhirah: tawzīʻ Dār al-Anṣār, 1980.  101 
 11 Ghazāli ̄, and ʻAbd al-Malik ibn ʻAbd Alla ̄h Ima ̄m 
al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī. Al-Mankhūl Min Taʻlīqāt Al-Uṣu ̄l.  
21 ( ا ال وفق م -ويندرج تحته االيجاب و الحضر-معناه: الحمل على ما فيه مشقه
 (يتشوف اليه الطبع او ينبو عنه
items of knowledge of real and objective 
attributes in the act itself, but to emotive 
impulses that arise within the agent in reaction 
to acts and occurrences.”12 In line with this anti-
realist ethical subjectivism, classical Ash‘arites 
resorted for a definition of legal subjectivity that 
situated revelation as the “sole legitimate source 
for norms that govern human action and 
behavior.”13 What this does to our perceptive of 
taklīf and its function, as understood by Ash‘arī 
jurists, is that one is unable to arrive naturally or 
by virtue of reason alone at the idea that one is 
obligated to perform certain actions and refrain 
from others. 
 The jurists argued that the imperative to 
perform or refrain from certain actions is 
achieved through the process of khiṭāb (divine 
communicative/prescriptive speech.) Therefore, 
the notion of khiṭāb is theoretically inseparable 
from the notion of taklīf. In fact, taklīf  is 
theorized by the jurists as a form of khiṭāb. 
However, before going into details about this 
relationship of synonymity between taklīf and 
khiṭāb, it is important to introduce the concept of 
al-hukm al-shar‘iī (revelatory ruling). A 
revelatory ruling is commonly defined by the 
jurists as a  divine prescriptive speech (khiṭāb) 
that is concerned with the actions of those who 
are legally responsible i.e. mukallaf.14 Therefore, 
the range of normative actions which are 
expected of the legal subject fall under the 
notion of aḥkām shar‘iyya (revelatory rulings). 
The reason why the notion of revelatory rulings 
is important in our context here is because it 
further clarifies the concept of taklīf and its 
relationship to divine communication.  
                                                 
 12 Shihadeh, Aymen.“Theories of Ethical Value in 
Kalām: A New Interpretation,” in Sabine Schmidtke --, et 
al. The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology. Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016,  400 
 13 Shihadeh, Aymen.“Theories of Ethical Value in 
Kalām: A New Interpretation,” in Sabine Schmidtke --, et 
al. The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology.  402 
 14 See: Ghazālī, and ʻAbd al-Malik ibn ʻAbd Alla ̄h 
Ima ̄m al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī. Al-Mankhūl Min Taʻlīqāt 
Al-Uṣu ̄l. [Dimashq?,] 1970.  21 
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 The revelatory rulings of Islamic law 
function as “a meeting point—for jurists, the 
meeting point—between the divine and the 
human, a meeting that takes place in the realm 
of language.”15 This idea of a meeting point 
between the Divine and Human that 
prescriptive speech makes possible, points to 
the kind of relationship between God and 
humans that is embedded in the concept of 
taklīf.  In this relationship, God is the law giver 
and human as legal subjects are the recipients of 
the law. Khiṭāb, as prescriptive speech carrying 
revelatory rulings, constitutes the relationship 
as one of taklīf. A relationship of the imposition 
of certain moral  injunctions from the law giver 
onto the legal subject. Thus, putting these 
elements in context with each other helps one 
gain a holistic image of taklīf, how it relates to 
the idea of khiṭāb and how it defines the 
relationship between the law giver and the 
legally responsible. Yet, the idea of khiṭāb and its 
relation to taklīf still requires more elaboration 
in order to unearth some of its nuances.  
  Khiṭāb as a term denoting divine 
prescriptive speech presupposes the existence of 
two sides of communication; an addressor and 
addressee.16 For the jurists, the fact that in this 
communicative act God is the addressor and 
humans are the addressees doesn’t alter the 
nature and character of communication. In so 
                                                 
 15 Powers, Paul. “Finding God and Humanity in 
Language: Islamic Legal Assessments as the Meeting Point 
of the Divine and Human,” in Sluglett, Peter, Bernard G. 
Weiss, A. Kevin Reinhart, and R. Gleave. 2014. Islamic Law 
in Theory : Studies on Jurisprudence in Honor of Bernard Weiss. 




 16 There is a difference of opinion between Ash‘arī 
jurist-theologians as to whether or not its accurate to call 
God’s speech a khiṭāb  given that for Ash‘ariets God’s 
speech is eternal and a khiṭāb presupposes the existence of 
an addressee. However, in our context the term khiṭāb is 
applicable because it takes into the consideration the 
existence of the addressee.  For the view that finds the term 
khiṭāb problematic see: Ba ̄qilla ̄nī, Taqri ̄b Wa-al-irshād "al-
ṣaghīr".  235-236; For the view that takes it be appropriate 
see: Zarkashī, Al-Baḥr Al-muḥīṭ Fī Uṣu ̄l Al-Fiqh.  126 
far as it is a form of communication, Divine 
prescriptive speech is not understood by the 
jurists to poses any special characteristics that 
differentiate it from normal human 
communicative acts. Just as any human 
communicative act, khiṭāb is understood to have 
certain characteristics that makes it an 
intelligible communication and which gives it a 
performative value. There is one main 
characteristic that is at the root of what khiṭāb is 
and what it is supposed to achieve. As a 
communicative/prescriptive speech between 
God and the legally responsible individual, 
khiṭāb is understood to perform one main 
function which is to create understanding 
(ifham) in the mind of the addressee. In other 
words, this entails that both the speech of the 
addressor should be intelligible and that the 
addressee should be able to understand it. This 
is articulated most clearly in al-Āmidī’s (d. 1233) 
definition of khiṭāb. He mentions that khiṭāb is 
“the utterance, on which there is a common 
convention as to its coinage (al-mutawaḍa‘a ‘alih), 
which is intended by it the creation of 
understanding on whom is equipped to 
understand.”17 Similarly, al-Ghazali emphasizes 
the intelligibility factor in speech by arguing 
that “the condition of khiṭāb is that it should be 
understood.”18 The centrality of this condition 
can’t be overstated because, as it will be clear 
later in the essay, it is upon it that the 
functionality of taklīf depends. For now, it is 
important to describe the types of khiṭāb 
discussed by the jurists and how each type 
relates to its addressee. 
 Khiṭāb is divided by the jurists into two 
types: khiṭāb al-taklīf and khiṭāb al-waḍʿh. This 
division is based on several distinctions 
between those two types of khiṭāb but the main 
ones are the fact that khiṭāb al-taklīf is directly 
concerned with the acquired actions of the legally 
responsible whereas khiṭāb al-waḍʿh is generally 
                                                 
 17 A ̄midī, ʻAli ̄ ibn Abi ̄ ʻAli ̄, and al-Sayyid Jumaylī. Al-
Iḥkām Fī Uṣu ̄l Al-Aḥkām. al-Ṭabʻah 1. Bayru ̄t, Lubnān: Dār 
al-Kita ̄b al-ʻArabī, 1984.  136 
 18 Ghazāli ̄, Al-Mankhūl Min Taʻlīqāt Al-Uṣu ̄l.  28 
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concerned with the host of conditions and 
casual relations that are necessary for the 
enacting or suspense of actions required by 
khiṭāb al-taklīf.19Another way of describing the 
difference between these two types of khiṭāb is to 
point out that while the former is prescriptive 
and evaluative, the latter is correlative and 
designative. Khiṭāb al-taklīf is prescriptive 
because it relates to actions by prescribing them 
as one of these categories; wajib (obligatory), 
mandub (recommended), mubaḥ (neutral), 
makruh (discouraged), ḥaram (prohibited).20 
Whereas, khiṭāb al-waḍʿh relates indirectly to 
actions by designating certain aspects related to 
actions as sabab (cause), shart (condition), mān‘i 
(inhibition) and by categorizing certain 
contracts as ṣaḥīḥ (valid) and bāṭil (null). It is 
important to note, that even though khiṭāb al-
waḍʿh is not concerned with acquired actions 
directly, it does relate to the actions of certain 
individuals such as the insane.  
 In the case of non-legally responsible 
individuals such as children or the insane, their 
actions fall under khiṭāb al-waḍʿh. However, 
under khiṭāb al-waḍʿh, the actions of the insane 
are not addressed in terms of their normative 
value, but it is primarily dealt with in terms of 
the material consequences of the actions. In the 
context of enumerating the differences between 
the types of khiṭāb, al-Zarkashī (d. 1392) 
mentions that khiṭāb al-takilf  “relates only to the 
actions of the legally responsible (mukallaf), and 
the waḍʿi relates to the actions of the non-legally 
responsible, for if a beast or a child destroyed 
something then the owner of the beast or the 
custodian of child insures [the replacement of 
that which was destroyed].”21 In this case, khiṭāb 
al-waḍʿh functions as a protective measure for 
both the non-legally responsible, in that they 
aren’t subject to punishment for any destructive 
actions that they might commit, and for the 
                                                 
 19. For more details see: Zarkashi ̄, Muḥammad ibn 
Bahādur, ʻAbd al-Qādir ʻAbd Allāh ʻĀnī, and ʻUmar 
Sulaymān Ashqar. Al-Baḥr Al-Muḥīṭ Fī Uṣu ̄l.  127-132 
 20. Zarkashī, Al-Bahṛ Al-muḥi ̄ṭ Fi ̄ Uṣūl Al-fiqh.  127; 
Āmidi ̄, Al-Iḥkām Fī Uṣu ̄l Al-Ahḳām.  96 
 21. Zarkashī, Al-Baḥr Al-Muḥīṭ Fī Uṣu ̄l Al-Fiqh.  128 
party who might be affected by that destructive 
actions.  
 Up to this point, the discussion has centered 
on the nature of taklīf as well as the nature of the 
Divine prescriptive speech, but the addressee of 
this speech has only been rudimentarily 
described as the legal subject (mukallaf). 
However, understanding the legal subject, her 
characteristics, and the conditions under which 
her actions carry normative value, is important 
if we are to adequately understand the nature of 
taklīf. In fact, understanding what type of legal 
subject the jurists had in mind when they spoke 
about taklīf will ultimately help us understand 
their views on the legal subjectivity of the 
insane. 
 
The Characteristics of Mukallaf (Legal Subject) 
 There are several conditions that the jurists 
described as being integral in making one 
legally responsible. Among the most important 
ones are maturity, reason, and understanding 
/comprehension.22 Legal maturity (bulūġ) is 
understood to be the point at which one’s 
rational capacity becomes fully developed. The 
development of one’s rational capacity is often 
understood by the jurists to occur on the 
occasion of puberty. However, this is not to say 
that the jurists saw any natural or necessary 
connection between the advent of puberty and 
rationality. In fact, they recognized that a child 
may possess the degree of rational capacity 
necessary for taklīf  prior to reaching puberty. 
For the jurists, though, puberty functioned as a 
practical and concrete sign that marks the 
perfection of one’s faculty of discernment. Al-
Āmidī mentions that “ because reason and 
understanding is hidden in him [the child], and 
its appearance in him is gradual, and that it 
does not have a criterion by which to know it, 
the law giver designated for it a criterion, and 
it’s puberty, and he exempted him from taklīf 
prior to it out of easiness.”23 As a condition for 
                                                 
 22. See: Āmidi ̄, Al-Iḥkām Fi ̄ Uṣu ̄l Al-Aḥkām.  199-200; 
For an extended treatment see: Zarkashi ̄, Baḥr.  344-384. 
 23. Āmidī, Iḥkam,  151 
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taklīf, maturity is inseparable from the second 
condition which is reason/rationality. If 
maturity is the occasion of rationality, what 
exactly do Ash‘arī jurists understand rationality 
to be? 
 The definition of reason in the Islamic 
intellectual tradition is articulated differently  
depending on the scholarly literature that it 
occurs in and even within the same kind of 
literature there exists certain variances on what 
reason is understood to be. For example, in the 
works of jurisprudence— which we are 
primarily dealing with— reason has been 
defined in many variant ways. Al-Bāqillanī 
defines ‘aql (reason) as “some of the necessary 
types of knowledge that is particular to those 
who are rational, such as; knowing that 
opposites don’t concur[simultaneously], and 
that what is known can either be existent or 
non-existent,… and that two is more than 
one, …. So whoever has these types of 
knowledge is ‘āqil (rational) and mukallaf (legally 
responsible).”24  
 Following al-Bāqillanī, al-Juwaynī defines 
reason as those types of knowledge that “are 
never absent from a rational person, and which 
he doesn’t share with non-rational persons…” 
and they are “ knowing the possibility of what 
is [rationally] possible, and the impossibility of 
what is [rationally] impossible…”25 However, in 
another context he provides a different and 
rather broader definition which considers 
reason to be a human disposition which 
functions as condition for knowledge and not a 
type of knowledge.26 What is interesting about 
al-Juwaynī’s former definition of reason is that 
it allows us to understand some of the 
discrepancies that one finds in the definitions of 
‘aql  that are provided by the jurists-theologians.  
                                                 
 24. Bāqillanī, Taqrīb, 197 
 25. Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, ʻAbd al-Malik ibn 
ʻAbd Alla ̄h, Muḥammad Yūsuf Mu ̄sá, and ʻAli ̄ ʻAbd al-
Munʻim ʻAbd al-Ḥami ̄d Kabīr. Kitāb Al-Irshād Ilá Qawāṭ‘i 
Al-Adillah Fī Uṣu ̄l Al-Iʻtiqād. Miṣr: Maktabat al-Kha ̄njī, 1950.  
22 
 26. Juwaynī, Burhān, 112-113 
 Al-Juwaynī reminds us that when 
providing a particular definition of reason, in 
his case defining reason as a type of necessary 
knowledge, he doesn’t negate the idea that 
reason (‘aql) is a word used for different 
meanings, rather, the “purpose is to describe the 
‘aql that is a condition for taklīf  and which if a 
person is devoid of she wouldn’t be able to 
know what she is held accountable for.”27 In 
other words, when defining reason the jurists 
didn’t necessarily have a universal category in 
mind, but that their definition of reason is often 
qualified by the context and subject that they are 
addressing. Keeping the previous definitions in 
mind, what does it mean to consider reason to 
be a type of necessary knowledge?  
 When one examines the types of necessary 
knowledge that are designated to be 
constitutive of reason, one finds that, unlike the 
epistemologically orientated understanding of 
reason articulated in works of Ash‘arī 
theology28, the root of what reason meant in the 
context of Ash‘arī jurisprudence is a capacity for 
discernment and of distinguishing benefit from 
harm. In fact, within the discussions of taklīf, the 
jurists often follow the term ‘aql (reason) with 
the term tamyīz (discernment). Those two terms 
are almost always mentioned together when the 
jurists describe the conditions of taklīf. It is as if 
the jurists are trying to point out that the 
condition of rationality is a condition of 
discernment by which an agent is able to 
generally distinguish between what is real and 
what is not and of what is beneficial and what is 
harmful. Reason as a capacity of discernment is 
related to and is complemented by the third 
condition of taklīf; that is fahm.  
 Fahm (comprehension) is one of the most 
emphasized conditions of taklīf. It appears in 
definitions of taklīf, in discussions about various 
issues (masa’il) related to taklīf  such as the issue 
                                                 
 27. Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī, Kitāb Al-Irshād Ilá 
Qawa ̄ṭ‘i Al-Adillah Fī Uṣu ̄l Al-Iʻtiqād.  21 
 28. See: Abrahamov, Binyamin. "Necessary Knowledge 
in Islamic Theology." British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 20, no. 1 (1993): 20-32. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 
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taklīf bil muhal (making one responsible of what 
is impossible to fulfill), and in discussions about 
conditions of taklīf. In a sense, fahm expresses all 
the conditions of taklīf at once because one can 
easily subsume the idea of maturity, rationality, 
and other conditions under it. There are, 
however, two important and interconnected 
ideas that are subsumed under the notion of 
comprehension and which has not been 
addressed yet. These ideas are knowledge (‘ilm) 
and intentionality/will (qaṣd). The jurists argue 
time and again that for one to respond to the 
divine address, one must first comprehend the 
address and then respond to it with a particular 
form of action that requires both knowledge and 
intentionality. Al-Ghazali mentions that “taklīf 
requires obedience and compliance, and this 
cannot occur except with an intention/will (qaṣd) 
to comply, and the condition of an intention/will 
is knowledge of what is intended/willed, and a 
comprehension (fahm) of talkif.”29 Of particular 
importance is the emphasis that the jurists put 
on the relationship between knowledge and 
intended action. Al-Zarkashī argues that the 
“performance of an action as a form of an 
intended obedience presupposes knowledge of 
that action.”30 Not only that they emphasized 
the necessity of knowledge to intended actions, 
the jurists also describe the types of knowledge 
that have to be in the mind of the legal subject 
when performing a certain act.  
 For actions to be considered as legitimate 
forms of carrying out obligations or refraining 
from prohibitions, these actions must be done 
by the legally responsible with an intention that 
is both defined i.e. intending to perform a 
particular action as opposed to another and an 
intention of obedience. Al-Bāqillanī mentions 
that for actions to fall under taklīf they must be 
performed by individuals who are characterized 
by “reason (‘aql), discernment (tamyīz), ability to 
receive (talaqqi) matters of worship, to know 
                                                 
 29. Ghazālī, and ʻAbd al-ʻAli ̄ ibn Muḥammad 
Anṣāri ̄. Kita ̄b Al-Mustaṣfá Min ʻIlm Al-Usu ̄l. Būlāq, Miṣr: 
Muṭbaʻah al-Amīri ̄yah, 1904.  277 
 30. Zarkashī, Baḥr,  350-351 
them, and to intend [to perform] the imposed 
actions specifically (qaṣd ma yukallafunahu bi 
‘aynihi).31 Therefore, a moral agent must not just 
have a general awareness of the actions she is 
performing, rather, an action that falls under 
taklīf, necessitates that the moral agent is 
intimately aware of how, why, and for whom 
the action is performed.  
 Al-Āmidī elaborates on the knowledge-
action relation by explaining that the addressee 
of divine prescriptive speech requires a 
particular level of comprehension of details. He 
mentions that in comprehending the khiṭāb  of 
God, the moral agent must understand that this 
speech is of the nature of “ a command and a 
prohibition, that it entails reward and 
punishment, that the one commanding it is God 
Almighty; that it’s obligatory to obey him, and 
that what is commanded is of the character of 
such and such…”32 Within the framework of 
taklīf, knowledge is therefore an integral element 
of the performance of intentional acts because it 
imbues actions with moral value. It is 
knowledge of the type that al-Āmidī mentioned 
that makes sure that acts are not just heedlessly 
preformed but that they are specifically carried 
out as a form of compliance (imtiṯāl). Thus, one 
can see that for the jurists, the notions of 
maturity, reason, and comprehension 
complemented each other and together formed 
the prerequisites of what it means to be a 
mukallaf (legal subject). There is, however, an 
additional common thread that passes along 
these conditions of taklīf that is worth noting.  
 The fact that the conditions of taklīf which 
the jurists emphasize the most are mainly of a 
cognitive nature is particularly significant. 
Ash‘arī jurists are not concerned with the notion 
of ability (qudrah) of the legal subject to translate 
what is imposed on her into concrete actions as 
much as they are concerned about the legal 
subject’s cognizance of divine speech and the 
intentional and obedient response to that 
speech. Of course, this is not to argue that the 
                                                 
 31. Bāqillanī, Taqrīb,  236 
 32. Āmidī, Iḥkam,  150 
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jurists do not address the issue of physical 
impediments and their inhibiting effect on the 
performance of obligated acts. In fact, in both 
their works of jurisprudence and law, the jurists 
never fail to discuss the ability of the individual 
to perform the obligations that are imposed on 
her and they painstakingly enumerate the 
various rukhaṣ (facilitations/alleviations) that are 
granted to the individual in response to a 
justifiable inhibiting circumstance (‘uḏur).33 
However, it still intriguing that in the context of 
khiṭāb al-taklīf  the conditions that the jurists 
emphasize are of a cognitive nature.  
 The jurist’s deep investment in the Ash‘arī 
theological tradition is particularly relevant to 
their cognitivist understanding of taklīf. Their 
focus on the cognitive nature of taklīf as opposed 
to the element of enacting power and its role in 
translating intentions into concrete actions is a 
direct result of their Ash‘arī theological leanings 
on Divine omnipotence and its implication on 
human’s ontology of action. Ashʿarites 
“emphasized God’s monopoly on creative 
agency in the universe, ” in that God for them 
was “the creator of all things and events, 
including volitional human action. For this 
reason, the Ashʿarites did not consider the 
absence of compulsion or coercion to be a 
condition of moral responsibility.”34 In other 
words, within an Ash‘arī  theological framework, 
man does not create his actions but acquires or 
performs them (kasb).  
 Despite the importance of the theory of kasb 
and its theological underpinnings, giving a 
detailed discussion of it would push us beyond 
the scope of this paper. What we are concerned 
with here is how the idea of acquiring one’s 
actions as opposed to freely creating them affect 
Ash‘arī jurist’s understanding of the nature of 
                                                 
 33. Katz, Marion H. ‘ʿAzīma and Rukhṣa’. In 
Encyclopedia of Islam, THREE, edited by Kate Fleet, Gudrun 
Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett 
Rowson. Accessed December 21, 2019. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_SIM_0261. 
 34. Syed, Mairaj. Coercion and Responsibility in Islam: A 
Study in Ethics and Law. First edition. Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2017.  28 
taklīf. There is no better example to explain this 
than the issue of coercion in Ash‘arī 
jurisprudence.  Drawing on the idea of kasb and 
its underlying assumptions about physical 
human agency, “Ash‘arites considering the 
problem of coercion (’ikrah) and moral agency 
arrived at the conclusion that there is nothing 
inherent in coercion itself that would make its 
absence a necessary condition for moral 
agency.”35 We find al-Bāqillanī arguing that:36 
  a coerced individual isn’t coerced except 
upon what he acquires and what he is enabled 
of, such as the one coerced to divorce [his wife] 
or sell [his property] or pronounce disbelief, and 
all of these actions if they happen they are his 
acquired actions (kasbun lah), and they occur 
with him being cognizant of them and 
particularly intending them (qaṣdihi ilayhi bi 
‘aynih) therefore it is valid to hold him legally 
responsible just as a person who is not coerced 
is held responsible.  
 This statement by al-Bāqillanī is particularly 
revealing because, on the one hand, it highlights 
the elements of qaṣd (intention/will) and ‘ilm 
(knowledge) as foundations for taklīf and, on the 
other hand, it asserts that both of those elements 
remain active even if an individual is coerced to 
perform or refrain from a certain action. 
Furthermore, the notion that a coerced agent 
still had the capability of willing an act and 
being cognizant of it means that coercion does 
not inhibit an agent’s reason. A sound reason 
was, for the Ash‘arites, the ultimate grounds for 
moral agency and given that “coercion does not 
compromise an agent’s reason, it does not 
undermine moral agency.”37  
                                                 
 35. Syed, Mairaj. Coercion and Responsibility in Islam: A 
Study in Ethics and Law.  69 
 36. Bāqillanī, Taqrīb,  250 
 37. Ibid. 28. Syed mentions that this was the Ash‘arites’ 
initial position but that they “subsequently changed this 
criterion to the capacity to understand speech (fahm).” 
While it is true the Ash‘arties came to emphasize the 
notion of fahm as a criterion of moral agency, this shouldn’t 
necessarily mean that the criterion of reason was replaced 
by that of fahm because fahm necessitates reason.  
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 A coerced individual is legally responsible 
not only because she still possesses 
intention/will and knowledge while performing 
an action, but that, for al-Bāqillanī  as well as for 
the majority of Ash‘arites, the freedom to “act 
otherwise” isn’t an option at the time of the 
action. This has to do with another dimension of 
Ash‘arite ontology of human actions. In line 
with their theory of kasb and their occasionalist 
ontology, Ash‘arites argued that the 
performative power to act is only granted at the 
occasion of action. Thus, al-Bāqillanī  mentions 
that “a person who is enabled to act, in our 
view, cannot abandon an act at the occasion of 
empowerment (ḥāl qudratihi ʿalyih).38 This 
inability to refrain from an action at the time of 
its enactment, then, doesn’t suspend the legal 
responsibility of a coerced individual because, 
for al-Bāqillanī, this is a quality that both 
coerced and non-coerced individuals share. 
There is, however, an important qualification 
that al-Bāqillanī provides which further 
supports the value that jurists placed on the 
cognitive nature of taklīf. For al-Bāqillanī, 
coercion is only conceivable to occur within the 
sphere of external actions. He argues that:39 
 coercion cannot occur except upon the 
visible actions of the limbs which are known to 
occur when they occur and known not occur 
when they are abandoned. As for coercion upon 
what is absent and conjectured from the actions 
of the mind, it is not possible that a servant is 
coerced to know something or be ignorant of it 
or love it or hate it or to believe in it or to will it, 
for this is impossible. 
 Therefore, al-Bāqillanī’s discussion of the 
issue of coercion and its relation to takilf allows 
us to understand the extent to which taklīf is 
fundamentally concerned with acts of the mind 
such as intentions/wills, knowledge, and 
understanding.  
 The discussion so far has been solely on the 
nature of the concept of taklīf and its various 
epistemic and ethical dimensions. It was 
                                                 
 38. Bāqillanī, Taqrīb,  251 
 39. Bāqillanī, Taqrīb,  256 
intentional to avoid directly addressing the legal 
subjectivity of the insane, because without a 
proper and holistic understanding of taklīf, any 
attempt to address the status of the insane in 
Islamic jurisprudence would render it 
unintelligible. However, now that we have a 
more nuanced image of Ash‘arī jurist’s 
understanding of taklīf and the way that their 
conception of it shapes their view of what a 
legal subject should be like, it’s appropriate to 
address the question of how does the insane as a 
legal subject fit into, or rather do not fit, this 
image? 
 
The Majnūn as a Legal Subject 
 As described in the beginning of the essay, 
Ash‘arite works of jurisprudence contain no 
direct or elaborate definition of insanity and its 
different variations. There is, however, a 
consistent juxtaposition between a majnūn 
(insane person) and a ʿāqil (rational/discerning 
person). We have seen that the jurists 
understand reason to be a type of necessary 
knowledge. They designate some types of 
necessary knowledge to be the distinguishing 
standard between a rational and non-rational 
individual. They also emphasize the element of 
discernment as sign of rationality. Therefore, 
considered as a non-rational individual, an 
insane person can be understood to have a 
disturbed command of the types of necessary 
knowledge that constitute reason. In addition, 
an insane person lacks a particular tamyīz 
(discernment) between benefit and harm. The 
consequences of this is that an insane person is 
not considered to be legally responsible 
(mukallaf). For, as al-Āmidī mentions, the 
condition of full legal subjectivity is that the 
legal subject “rational (ʿāqil) and 
comprehending of taklīf, because taklīf is a khiṭāb 
(prescriptive speech) and to engage in a 
prescriptive speech with a non-rational and 
non-comprehending individual is impossible, 
such as if it were an inanimate object or a 
beast.”40 However, as al-Āmidī indicates above, 
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it isn’t just the lack of the condition of 
rationality that diminishes the legal subjectivity 
of the insane, but it is also the implication of the 
absence of reason on the ability of the insane to 
comprehend God’s prescriptive speech that 
additionally inhibits his legal subjectivity.  
 We have pointed out above that fahm 
(comprehension) is one of the main conditions 
of taklīf. Ash‘arī jurists consistently point out 
that taklīf  is a form of prescriptive speech that 
necessitates both an understanding and an 
appropriate response on the part of the 
addressee. In the case of an insane individual, 
Ash‘arī jurists claim that there is an element of 
understanding that can be accounted for her 
when addressed by a prescriptive speech. Al-
Āmidī mentions that a majnūn and a non-
discerning child exhibit a “basic understanding 
of the foundation of prescriptive speech (aṣl al-
fihmi li aṣl al-khiṭāb) without its details.”41  
 However, as mentioned above, the type of 
understanding that is necessary for taklīf  is one 
that requires a possession of certain types of 
knowledge which enables the addressee to 
comprehend the moral thrust of the speech. For 
an addressee of prescriptive speech to be legally 
responsible, she must know that this speech is 
of the nature of “a command and a prohibition, 
that it entails reward and punishment, that the 
one commanding it is God Almighty; that it’s 
obligatory to obey him, and that what is 
commanded is of the character of such and 
such…”42  
 The jurists stress that these types of 
knowledge that underlay the concept of fahm are 
inaccessible to an insane individual. In fact, al-
Āmidī thinks that this kind of comprehension 
lay way beyond the ability of an insane 
individual that he argues that, with respect to 
understand the detailed import of prescriptive 
speech, an insane individual and a non-
discerning child are like an inanimate object or a 
beast in their understanding of the basic import 
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 42 Āmidī, Iḥkam, 150 
of speech.43 The idea of receptive 
comprehension of the moral thrust of speech 
that the jurists saw as lacking in an insane 
individual was only one part of the larger 
concept of fahm which comprises both receptive 
and active dimensions of understanding.  
 Ash‘arī jurists contend that for an addressee 
of prescriptive speech to actively respond to its 
demands, she must possess a degree of 
awareness that includes within it an element of 
knowledge and an element of intentionality/will 
(qaṣd). Al-Ghazali mentions that one of the 
conditions of an action that qualifies it as falling 
under taklīf is that the act must be “known to the 
one commanded by it, a knowledge that 
distinguishes (tamyīz) it from its others, so that it 
will be possible for her to intend/will it.”44 Not 
only that an action has to be particularly known, 
but that it also has to be particularly 
intended/willed. One has to know that the 
action that one is about to embark upon is 
commanded by God so that it will be performed 
with the particular intention of imtiṯāl 
(compliance) and ṭa‘ah (obedience).45  
 The jurists often address this issue of 
intentionality and obedience when they discuss 
the question of the legal responsibility of the 
mentally disoriented (al-sahy or al- ġafil) and the 
drunken (al-sakran). Ash‘arī jurists consider the 
mentally disoriented and the drunken to be 
non-legally responsible because they lack 
knowledge of their actions and an intentional 
obedience. Al-Bāqillanī mentions that the 
mentally disoriented and the drunken are not 
legally responsible because their actions are 
performed while they are not aware of them 
and not intending/willing them, “for it is not 
possible while they are unaware of their action, 
to be knowledgeable of them and particularly 
intend them, let alone intend them for the sake 
of drawing near to God as opposed to 
others…”46 Just as the mentally disoriented and 
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the drunken, the insane is exempt from legal 
responsibility because of the lack of ability to 
perform actions while being aware of their 
moral value i.e. that they are particularly 
performed with the intention of compliance and 
obedience to God. Interestingly, the jurists 
considered the mental state of the insane to be 
far better than that of the mentally disoriented 
or the drunken in that their scope of knowledge 
and intentions/wills are larger with respect to 
many actions.47 However, the degree of 
knowledge and intentionality that the insane 
possessed wasn’t enough to qualify them as 
legally responsible.  
  
Conclusion  
 As illustrated by this study, the question of 
legal subjectivity is one that preoccupied classical 
Ash‘arī jurists. As jurist-theologians, their 
understanding of legal subjectivity was 
formulated along theological and juristic lines 
and was crystallized in their adoption of concept 
of taklīf. Their particular use of taklīf in 
articulating the nature of legal subjectivity and 
the range of epistemological and ethical 
assumptions embedded in it, created a 
framework of legal subjectivity that left the 
majnūn outside the law’s domain of address. 
Understanding the concept of taklīf as arising 
from divine prescriptive address, Ash‘arī jurists 
went on to articulate a theory of legal subjectivity 
centered on the mental capacity of the legal 
subject to comprehend the moral import of that 
address and to respond to it with cognizant and 
intentional obedience. In stressing the value of 
cognitive ability, Ash‘arī jurists contended that 
the majnūn’s comprehension fell short of the level 
necessary to acquire legal subjectivity. Beyond 
the issue of the legal subjectivity of the majnūn, 
this analysis of taklīf  allows us to understand 
some of the ways in which Ash‘arī jurists 
conceived of reason/ rationality, the relationship 
between intentionality, knowledge and action, 
and the nature of divine speech and its 
normative value.  
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